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INTERPRETING THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND 
HEAL TH ACT OF 1970 
Some Early Principles and Commentaries 
Robert D. Moran* 
Commissioner Moran expounds upon several early interpreta· 
tions of the provisions of the Occupational Safety and Health 
Act of 1970 concerning the definition of what constitutes a 
"recognized hazard" under the General Duty Clause of the 
Act, the responsibility of employers for the unsafe acts of their 
employees, the establishment of what constitutes a "reasonable 
time" between an inspection and the issuance of a citation, the 
appropriateness of penalties, and the extent to which stipula-
tions should be accepted by the Commission. He suggests that, 
while the Act is undergoing growing pains, several of its more 
important sections have been sufficiently litigated so as to 
provide guidelines for those subject to its coverage. 
INTRODUCTION 
Although employers will soon be entering their third year under the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970,1 many of those 
employers subject to its coverage are still unaware of its requirements. 
This article will seek to review briefly the history and substance of this 
law, and will investigate some of the principles which have emerged 
from cases adjudicated thereunder, such as what constitutes a 
"recognized hazard," and what comprise the new responsibilities of 
employers. 
Like the National Labor Relations Ace and the Fair Labor 
Standards Act, 3 its statutory kindred spirits of three decades ago, this \ 
new law was conceived amid legislative controversy even though there 
was general agreement on the need to alleviate the social and economic 
ills it was designed to cure.4 The Occupational Safety and Health Act 
* Mr. Moran, a member of the Massachusetts Bar, is Chairman of the United States 
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission. 
1. 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1970). 
2. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970). 
3. 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1970). 
4. The National Labor Relations Act of 1935, ch. 372, § 1,49 Stat. 449, the famous "Wagner 
Act," providing the first federal recognition of the right to organize and bargain 
collectively, protected the workers' discharge for such activities. The Fair Labor Standards 
Act of 1938, ch. 676_, § 1, 52 Stat. 1060, protected the workers' pocketbooks by providing for 
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of 19705 is essentially a compromise among the often diverse desires of 
organized labor, management, forces pushing for environmental 
improvements and government leaders whose purposes often diverge 
from those of nongovernment supporters. In its final legislative stages, 
two different bills emerged from the two Houses of Congress which 
were similar, yet differed in many important provisions. Senator 
Harrison Williams of New Jersey was closely identified with one of the 
bills,6 while the other was guided through the House under the 
leadership of Representative William A. Steiger of Wisconsin. 7 The Act 
has since become appropriately known as the Williams-Steiger 
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970.8 
The Act vested in the Secretary of Labor the obligation to enforce 
compliance with its requirements.9 To discharge this responsibility, the 
Act provided him with an Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupa-
tional Safety and Health, I 0 who heads a section within the Department 
already well known by its acronym, OSHA (The Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration). He, in turn, is assisted by "compliance 
officers," who conduct inspections· of workplaces, both in response to 
complaints and on their own initiative. At the end of 1972, OSHA had 
about 500 of these compliance officers at work throughout the 
country. 
The Act further authorizes "the· Secretary of Labor to set mandatory 
occupational safety and health standards applicable to businesses 
affecting interstate commerce ... ," and creates "an Occupational 
Safety and Health Review Commission for carrying out adjudicatory 
functions under the Act."1 I 
a minimum hourly wage rate, mandatory overtime pay, and the prohibition of wage 
differentials by sex and age. With the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 
U.S.C. § 651 (1970); the federal government has moved decisively to protect the workers' 
lives and limbs. 
Congress has long recognized the need for minimum safety and health standards. 
However, the legislators either thought their scope of authority did not extend to the 
promulgation of such standards or feared the reactions of the businessmen who would be 
forced to spend to improve the working conditions for their employees. Thus, while the 
Walsh-Healey Act of 1936, ch. 881, § 1, 49 Stat. 2036, prohibited the federal purchase of 
items manufactured under "unsanitary or hazardous" working conditions, it did not forbid 
the conditions themselves. It was not until 1960 that safety and health standards were 
promulgated under it. 
5. 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1970). 
6. The Williams' bill, S. 2193, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), which had the solid support of 
organized labor, placed total responsibility in the field of occupational safety and health 
with the Secretary of Labor. The Secretary would have set standards, conducted the 
complicance inspections, and adjudicated all violations under this version. 
7. H.R. 16785, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). This was the administration's bill which featured 
promulgation of safety and health standards by an independent board, compliance 
inspections by the Secretary, and adjudication by an independent commission. 
8. 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1970). 
9. Occupational Safety and Health Act § 8(a), 29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (1970) '[hereinafter cited as 
OSHA]. 
10. [d. § 29(a)(2). 
11. [d. § 2(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(3). 
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It should be noted that the Review Commission is an independent 
agency created by § 12 of the Act and is a body exclusively exercising 
judicial functions, notwithstanding its placement in the executive, 
rather than the judicial branch.' 2 The statute provides that this 
Commission shall be composed of three members,' 3 each of whom is 
appointed by the President for a six year term. '4 The Chairman of the 
Commission is empowered to appoint Review Commission Judges, who 
hold terms of career tenure,' 5 and who hear all cases entered in the 
Commission,' 6 rendering the final decision in better than 90 percent of 
them. 
In the statute, the Review Commission Judges are called "hearing 
examiners,'" 7 a designation perhaps more appropriate for federal 
regulatory agencies than for a commission whose sole function is to 
adjudicate adversary proceedings.' 8 As the proper title for persons 
engaged in this function is "judge," the Commission, in its first year of 
existence, exercised its authority' 9 to make this title official. 2 0 The 
Commission presently has 42 judges who travel throughout the country 
in order to conduct all hearings in the community where the alleged 
violation took place.2 , 
The Act imposes numerous requirements upon management, which 
are set forth in just two clauses, covering only seven lines of print in § 
5(a) of the Act: 
Each employer-
(1) shall furnish to each of his employees employment and a 
place of employment which are free from recognized hazards 
that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical 
harm to his employees; 
(2) shall comply with occupational safety and health 
standards promUlgated under this Act. 2 2 
Few employers are excluded from its coverage. 2 3 
Pursuant to the Act, the Secretary of Labor has already promulgated 
12. Id. § 12(a), 29 U.S.C. § 661(a). 
13. [d. 
14. Id. § 12(b), 29 U.S.C. § 661(b). 
15. Id. § 12(e), 29 U.S.C. § 661(d). 
16. [d. § 12(j), 29 U.S.C. § 661(i). 
17. [d. §§ 12(e), (j), (k), 29 U.S.C. §§ 661(d), (i), (j). 
18. Id. § 12(j), 29 U.S.C. § 661(i). 
19. 5 U.S.C. § 5105(c) (1970). 
20. 37 Fed. Reg. 16,787 (1972). See also OSHRC Release No. 15 (Mar. 23, 1972). 
21. OSHA § 12(d), 29 U.S.C. § 661(c) (1970). Such is the case if adequate courtroom facilities 
are available there; but if not, then the nearest available facility appropriate for the 
conduct of a hearing is used. 
22. OSHA § 5(a), 29 U.S.C. § 654(a) (1970). 
23. The only workers not covered by OSHA are those whose jobs are covered by other federal 
legislation such as that regulating coal mining: Coal Mine Health and Safety Act, 30 
U.S.C. § 801 (1970); and atomic energy: Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2021 
(1970). 
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numerous occupational safety and health standards, and many more 
will undoubtedly be forthcoming.2 4 
If one of OSHA's compliance officers discloses what is believed to be 
a violation of the Act, the employer will, within a reasonable time, 
receive two documents from the Labor Department: (1) a citation 
describing the nature of the violation by referring to the particular 
"provision of the Act, standard, rule, regulation or order violated and 
fixing a reasonable time for the abatement of the violation ... "2 5 ; and 
(2) a notification of the proposed monetary penalty, which will be 
stated as a sum certain.2 6 
Upon receipt of these two documents, the employer has two 
alternatives: (1) correct the violation and pay the penalty as proposed; 
or (2) contest the issuance of the citation, the amount of the proposed 
penalty, or both. If the employer should decide to contest the citation 
and proposed penalty, he must take affirmative action by notifying the 
Secretary within 15 working days.27 Should the employer fail to act 
within that time "the citation and the assessment, as proposed, shall be 
deemed a final order ... and not subject to review by any court or 
agency,,,28 (which has, in fact, happened in 95 percent of the more 
than 40,000 enforcement actions initiated to date under this Act). 
However, when an employer takes affirmative action within 15 
working days to dispute the Labor Department's action against him, he 
thereby initiates a contest to the enforcement action. Since there has 
been no hearing (merely an allegation of a violation coupled with a 
proposed penalty), the employer's action putting them in dispute is 
called, for the purposes of this Act, a Notice of Contest. 
As a statutory matter, the Notice of Contest can merely be a letter 
from the employer to the Secretary of Labor stating, "I contest the 
action you have initiated against me.,,2 9 However, procedurally, there 
is a little more to it. The employer's letter must be sent to the Area 
Director of the Labor Department's Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA),30 whose name and address will be listed on 
both the citation and the proposed penalty, the latter informing the 
employer of exactly what he must do to contest. Then, the employer 
must notify his own employees that he is contesting the Labor 
Department's action. This has been imposed pursuant to the Rules of 
Procedure of the Occupational Safety and Health Review3 1 Commis-
sion in order to effectuate the last sentence of § 10(c) of the Act: 
24. OSHA § 6(a), 29 U.S.C. § 655(a) (1970). 
25. [d. § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 658(a). 
26. [d. § 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 659(a). 
27. [d. 
28. [d. 
29. [d. § lO(e), 29 U.S.C. § 659(e). 
30. 29 C.F.R. § 1903, 17(a) (1972). 
31. OSHA § 12(g), 29 U.S.C. § 661(f) (1970). 
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"The rules of procedure prescribed by the Commission shall 
provide affected employees or representatives of affected 
employees an opportunity to participate as parties to hearings 
under this subsection."3 2 
Once the OSHA Area Director receives the employer's Notice of 
Contest, he will mail it directly to the Executive Secretary of the 
Review Commission together with a copy of all citations and penalty 
proposals which the employer is contesting.3 3 A docket number is then 
assigned to the case, and the parties are notified. 
Henceforth, the procedure follows the traditional system for the 
hearing of a nonjury civil case: the Commission notifies all parties of 
the docketing of the case, the Secretary of Labor must file a formal 
Complaint within 20 days34 of his receipt of the Notice of Contest, 
and the employer's Answer is due within 15 days35 after receipt 
thereof. After completion of the pleadings, the case is heard as soon as 
a judge becomes available, unless a pre-hearing conference is decided 
upon.36 ' 
Hearings are conducted in accordance with the Administrative 
Procedure Act and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.3 7 The burden 
of proof is on the Secretary of Labor,3 8 and there is no presumption of 
regularity in favor of either the Labor Department's citation or its 
penalty proposal. 
When the judge decides a case, there is no statutory right to review 
by the Commission. His decision will automatically become a final 
order 30 days after it is filed, unless, within such period, anyone of the 
three members exercises his right of discretionary review.3 9 However, 
since the Act provides that all final orders of the Commission may be 
appealed to the appropriate United States Court of Appeals,4 0 it does 
not matter whether the final order is based on the decision of the 
Review Commission Judge or the action of the members of the 
Commission themselves after the exercise of their review rights. , 
Current figures indicate that the Commission has only exercised its 
discretionary right of review in approximately ten percent of the 
decisions filed with it by the judges. But when this does occur, the 
32. [d. § 1O(c), 29 V.S.C. § 659(c). 
33. [d. 
34. 29 C.F.R. § 2200.33(a)(1) (1972). The Rules of Procedure of the Occupational Safety and 
Health Review Commission became effective with their publication in the Federal 
Register on September 28, 1972. 37 Fed. Reg. 20,237. They are codified in volume 29 of the 
Code of Federal Regulations. 29 C.F.R. §§ 2200.1-.110 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Rule]. 
(In this article the codification prefix "2200" which precedes each rule number as it is 
published in the Federal Register and the Code of Federal Regulations has been omitted.) 
35. Rule 33(b)(l). 
36. Rule 51. 
37, OSHA § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 659(c) (1970). 
38. [d.; Rule 73(a). 
39. OSHA § 12(j), 29 U.S.C. § 66l(i) (1970). 
40. [d. § l1(a), 29 U.S.C. § 660(a). 
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parties are notified and given the opportunity to submit briefs and 
exceptions. Oral arguments have never been scheduled in any 
proceeding, the Commission basing its decision on the briefs and the 
record made before the Review Commission Judge. Although anyone 
of the three members can exercise his statutory right of discretionary 
review, a majority of the members is needed to decide a case. 
Some principles of law are already beginning to emerge from the first 
500 decisions rendered by the Review Commission.4 1 These include: 
the definition of what constitutes a "recognized hazard" under the 
General Duty Clause of the Act; the responsibility of employers for 
unsafe acts of their employees; the establishment of what constitutes a 
"reasonable time" between an inspection and the issuance of a citation; 
the appropriateness of penalties; and the extent to which stipUlations 
(particularly with regard to penalties) should be accepted by the 
Commission. 
"RECOGNIZED HAZARD" AND THE GENERAL 
DUTY CLAUSE 
The General Duty Clause, § 5(a)(1), reads as follows: 
Each employer-
(1) shall furnish to each of his employees employment and a 
place of employment which are free from recognized hazards 
that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical 
harm to his employees;4 2 
The General Duty Clause, contained above, was the result of 
legislative compromise, having both ardent supporters and vigorous 
opponents. The clause was inserted because there was general 
agreement among the bill's proponents that not every job safety and 
health situation could be covered by a specific standard. It was assumed 
that the clause would be invoked sparingly4 3 in enforcement 
procedures, and that the Secretary would rely to the greatest extent 
possible on specific standards. While that, for the most part, has proven 
to be the case, there still have been a relatively small number of 
employers whom the Secretary has charged with violations of the 
General Duty Clause. 
41. A caveat is in order at this point. There are some who take the position that the opinions of 
its judges, which are allowed to become final by the failure of the Commission to exercise 
its 30 day option to certify a case for review, have no precedential value on the grounds 
that when the Commission permits the judge's order and decision to become final, it 
adopts the order only because it favors the result. The statute, however, specifies that 
decisions which become final in this way become the final order of the Commission. 
OSHA § 12(j), 29 U.S.C. § 661(i) (1970). 
42. OSHA § 5(a)(l), 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (1970). 
43. 116 CONGo REC. 42,206 (1970). 
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Obviously, the problem of the General Duty Clause arises from the 
vagueness of "recognized hazards." Congressman Steiger, speaking of 
the bill that emerged from the House-Senate conference said that: 
"Such hazards are the type that can be readily detected on the basis of 
the basic human senses. Hazards which require technical or testing 
devices to detect . . . are not intended to be within the scope of the 
general duty requirement."4 4 
Representative Daniels of New Jersey maintained that: 
A recognized hazard is a condition that is known to be 
hazardous, and is known not necessarily by each and every 
individual employer but is known taking into account the 
standard of knowledge in the industry. In other words, whether 
or not a hazard is 'recognized' is a matter for objective 
determination; it does not depend on whether the particular 
employer is aware of it.4 5 
A reasonable interpretation would seem that, to establish a violation 
of this clause, the evidence of record must show that the condition 
cited was readily determined by unaided human senses, and that the 
condition is recognized as a hazard likely to cause death or serious 
physical injury by reasonable and prudent people, not merely by safety 
experts or OSHA inspectors. 
In most of the few cases decided under this clause, there was 
evidence that the employer either admitted that he knew his working 
conditions constituted a recognized hazard, or that fact had been 
affirmatively brought to his attention in some manner prior to the time 
he was charged. In two instances where it was my opinion that this was 
not the case, I found it necessary to dissent from the majority opinion 
which found the employer in violation. 
In Secretary ot Labor v. Hidden Valley Corporation ot Virginia, 4 6 it 
was found that the employer, while in the process of digging trenches 
for a sewer pipe, allowed empioyees to work in a trench ten feet deep 
which had not been shored or sloped. The trench collapsed, killing two 
persons, which precipitated a citation of Hidden Valley for violating the 
General Duty Clause. 
The judge made 15 findings of fact relative to the trench collapse, 
but in none of them did he find that the condition of the trench 
constituted a recognized hazard. He found that working in such a 
trench coqstituted a "hazard" and that such a trench "is considered 
unsafe,,,47 yet, he ruled (and a majority of the Commission agreed) 
that the employer had violated the General Duty Clause. 
44. [d. 
45. [d. at 38,377. 
46. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission [hereinafter cited as OSHRC) Dock. 
No. 11, 2 CCH EMPLOYMENT SAFETY AND HEALTH GUIDE [hereinafter cited as 2 CCH EMPL. 
S. & H.G.) ~ 15,035 (Feb. 8, 1972). 
47. Judge's Report at 4. 
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I dissented, feeling that if merely establishing that a certain condition 
constitutes a "hazard" is sufficient to sustain a violation of § 5(a)(1) of 
the Act, there would be no need for the Labor Department ever to cite 
an employer under any other provision. It appeared that the purpose of 
the Congress had been ignored, and that the Commission's majority had 
converted a precisely-worded legislative enactment into a sweeping 
general requirement which endangered the usefulness of the detailed 
standards promulgated by the Secretary.4 8 
Again, in Secretary of Labor v. National Realty and Construction 
CO.,49 it did not appear to me that the facts established that the 
violation with which the employer was charged constituted a rec-
ognized hazard. The facts there indicate that in September of 1971, 
one of National Realty's foremen was riding on the "running-board" of 
a front-end loader at a construction site. As the loader descended a dirt 
ramp, the engine stalled; the loader continued down the ramp, 
overturned, and fatally injured the foreman. Shortly thereafter, the 
Secretary of Labor cited National Realty for a violation of the General 
Duty Clause.5o The Review Commission Judge accepted the compli-
ance officer's statement that "the general safety requirements of the 
Corps of Engineers prohibited riding on equipment .... "51 as 
sufficient evidence to find that such an act constituted a recognized 
hazard likely to result in serious injury or death, a finding with which 
the majority again agreed. 
To my mind, this was clearly contrary to the intention of Congress. 
This decision said, in essence, that if general safety requirements of 
some standard-establishing authority prohibit an act, then that act 
should be assumed to be a recognized hazard. Obviously, as there are 
many acts prohibited by the general requirements of the Corps of 
Engineers in the interests of employee safety, by the standards 
promUlgated by the Secretary of Labor, and by those of many other 
; authorities, it would be clearly unreasonable to say that every act 
prohibited in the interests of safety constitutes a recognized hazard 
"causing or likely to cause death or serious physical injury."s 2 
EMPLOYER RESPONSIBILITY FOR EMPLOYEE ACTS 
AND OMISSIONS 
The Act exhorts employees to "comply with Occupational Safety 
and Health standards,"s 3 but it places the real burden of providing a 
48. OSHRC Dock. No. 11, 2 CCH EMPL. S. & H.G. '\I 15,035, at 20,048-49. 
49. OSHRC Dock. No. 85, 2 CCH EMPL. S. & H.G. '\115,188 (Sept. 6, 1972). 
50.Id. 
51. Id. at 20,270. 
52. OSHA § 5(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (1970). 
53. Id. § 5(b), 29 U.S.C. § 654(b). 
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safe and healthful workplace on the employer.s 4 Since there are no 
enforcement procedures or penalties for unsafe acts by employees, only 
the employer faces the punitive teeth of the Act. s 5 Further, because 
the Act does not restrict violations to unsafe acts authorized or 
permitted by the employer, he can also be found in violation if he knew 
or could have known "with the exercise of reasonable diligence"S 6 of 
an unsafe practice. 
While the Act attempts to make it clear to employers that they have 
final responsibility for compliance, it would be unreasonable to assume 
that the employer is necessarily in violation of the Act whenever one of 
his employees fails to comply with a standard. For example, in 
Secretary of Labor v. Standard Glass Co.,S 7 the judge ruled that the 
employer was not in violation for an isolated instance in which two of 
its employees failed to wear protective headgear in a "hard hat" area. 
On review, the Commission affirmed, stating: 
An employer cannot in all circumstances be held to the strict 
standard of being an absolute guarantor or insurer that his 
employees will observe all of the Secretary's standards at all 
times. An isolated brief violation of a standard by an employee 
which is unknown to the employer and is contrary to both the 
employer's instructions and a company work rule which the 
employer has uniformly enforced does not necessarily consti-
tute a violation of section 5(a)(2) of the Act by the 
employer.s S 
As was noted in National Realty,S 9 the Commission found that the 
isolated act of the foreman in riding on the loader violated a company 
rule that had been the responsibility of the employer to enforce. 6 0 
However, in view of the firm's history of not allowing anyone to ride 
on such equipment, there seemed to me no way in which the employer, 
in exercising "reasonable diligence," could have known about the act. 
Accordingly, I felt that there was no way ~he employer could have been 
aware of the unsafe act and taken measures to prevent it, short of 
assigning a supervisor to follow the foreman around during his working 
hours.61 
Indeed, in Secretary of Labor v. Hansen Bra thers Logging Co., 62 the 
Commission adopted a rationale similar to that which I had espoused in 
54. Id. § 5(a), 29 U.S.C. § 654(a). 
55. Id. § 17,29 U.S.C. § 666. 
56. Id. § 17(k), 29 U.S.C. § 666(j). 
57. OSHRC Dock. No. 259, 2 CCH EMPL. S. & H.G.,-r 15,146 (June 26,1972). 
58. Id. at 20,219. 
59. OSHRC Dock. No. 85, 2 CCH EMPL. S. & H.G. ,-r 15,188 (Sept. 6, 1972). 
60.Id. 
61. Id. at 20,268-71 (dissent). , 
62. OSHRC Dock. No. 141, 2 CCH EMPL. S. & H.G. ,-r 15,258 (Oct. 13, 1972). Respondent 
operated a small logging business employing about five people. In the operation of the 
business, it was necessary to load logs onto trucks with a crane-like log-loading machine 
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National Realty. 6 3 There, the Commission, in overruling the Review 
Commission Judge, stated: 
The record shows that respondent's owner gave specific oral 
instructions to its employees to stay clear of the loading area 
while the equipment was in motion. The hazard was obvious. 
Respondent's employees were repeatedly reminded of the 
danger involved and were told to stay out unless they were 
instructed to approach the area after the machinery had been 
stopped. There is nothing in the record to show that 
respondent's owner knew or reasonably should have known that 
the deceased employee would disobey these instructions. In the 
presence of these conditions, and because of the nature of the 
operation, to require respondent to provide one-on-one super-
vision of its employees would place respondent under the 
unreasonably burdensome duty of having to establish the 
whereabouts of each of its employees prior to every operation 
of its equipment.6 4 
However, the Commission has barely begun to move into this 
extremely difficult area. We are just beginning to ask the questions: 
answers, if there are any, will come only after an arduous struggle with 
Gordian complexities. Quaere: To what extent is the employer 
responsible for the apparently negligent acts of his employees? Can the 
employer's duty of care be reduced or alleviated by providing his 
employees with detailed, mandatory safety instructions? Can the 
employer's responsibility be limited at all, or is he to be responsible for 
the unsafe acts and omissions of his employees under all but the most 
extraordinary of circumstances? Can rigid guidelines be established to 
define employer responsibility, or must an ad hoc determination be 
made? As the Commission rules on cases involving these questions, it is 
hoped that at least rudimentary guidelines will be established. 
REASONABLE TIME BETWEEN INSPECTION AND 
ISSUANCE OF CITATION 
The Act is vague with regard to the period of time the Secretary of 
Labor has to issue his citation after a job safety and health inspection. 
The Act requires merely that the Secretary "shall with reasonable 
promptness issue a citation to the employer,,,6 5 and may not issue one 
that would rotate through an arc of approximately 180 degrees during the loading 
operation. An employee, apparently having been struck by part of the machine, was killed. 
The recmd showed that the respondent had repeatedly warned his employees to stand 
clear of the area while the machine was in operation because of the obvious hazard it 
presented. 
63. OSHRC Doc. No. 85, 2 CCH EMPL. S. & H.G. 1/ 15,188, at 20.268-71 (Sept. 6, 1972) 
(dissent). 
64. Secretary of Labor v. Hansen Brothers Logging Co., OSHRC Dock. No. 141, 2 CCH EMPL. 
S. & H.G. 1/15,258, at 20,341 (Oct. 13, 1972). 
65. OSHA § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 658(a) (1970). 
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subsequent to the passage of six months following the alleged 
violation.66 The Secretary ha,s, on at least one occasion, taken almost 
80 days of "reasonable" time between the inspection and the issuance 
of a citation,67 but that extent of delay was not intended by Congress. 
The "Statement of the Managers of Part of the House," commenting on 
the conference committee from which the Act emerged, addresses this 
point: 
The Senate bill provided that if, upon inspection or 
investigation, the Secretary or his authorized representative 
"determines" that an employer has violated mandatory require-
ments under the act, he shall "forthwith" issue a citation .. The 
House amendment provided that if on the basis of an inspection 
or investigation the Secretary "believes" that an employer has 
violated such requirements, he shall issue a citation to the 
employer. The conference report provides that if the Secretary 
"believes" that an employer violated such requirements he shall 
issue the citation with "reasonable promptness." In the absence 
of exceptional circumstances any delay is not expected to 
exceed 72 hours from the time the violation is detected by the 
inspector.6 8 
The Commission has not, as yet, issued any decision regarding 
_ ",reasonable time," but the manifestly clear intent of Congress is for the 
Commission to hold the Secretary of Labor to the 72 hour limit in 
routine cases. Thus, failure of the Secretary to issue a citation within 72 
hours of an inspection should ordinarily be a strong argument for 
dismissal of any citation resulting therefrom. 
APPROPRIATENESS OF PENALTIES 
The area in which the Commission has established the firmest 
guidelines is that of penalties. At the outset, a point should be made 
that has proven very difficult to establish: the Labor Department 
merely proposes penalties,69 while the power to assess penalties rests 
with the Review Commission. Only where an employer fails to file 
timely Notice of Contest 70 does the OSHA penalty proposal (no matter 
how unjust) become final, as the Commission and all other courts and 
66. [d. § 9(c), 29 U.S.C. § 658(c). 
67. In a case still in review, Secretary of Labor v. Plastering, Inc., OSHRC Dock. No. 1037, 
rev'd ordered, Oct. 31, 1972, the inspection took place on March 21, 1972; and no citation 
was issued until June 6, 1972. There are a number of other cases where the lag between 
inspection and citation is one of the issues to be decided in which shorter, but still 
unreasonably long, delays occurred. 
68. 160 CONGo REC. 42,200 (1970). 
69. OSHA § lO(b), 29 U.S.C. § 659(b) (1970). 
70. [d. 
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agencies7 I are thereby excluded from the process. However, when a 
contest is filed, the Secretary's penalty proposal should be accorded no 
more weight than is given his evidence and argument on the alleged 
violation. If the Department of Labor establishes to the satisfaction of 
the Review Commission Judge that the employer has indeed violated 
the Act, the next question should not be whether the Secretary's 
penalty proposal is appropriate, but rather, what penalty, if any, is 
appropriate for the infraction. 
During its first year and a half, there were a number of cases in which 
the Commission differed with OSHA on penalties. The first of these 
cases arose out of the OSHA Compliance Operations Manual,7 2 which 
ptovided a formula to guide its people in arriving at an amount to be 
proposed as a penalty.73 While § 17 (j) of the Act provided that, in 
assessing civil penalties, the Commission shall give "due consideration 
to the appropriateness of the penalty with respect to the size of the 
business ... , the gravity of the violation, the good faith of the 
employer, and the history of previous violations,"7 4 the formula called 
for calculations which began with the maximum permissible penalty, 
then applied varying percentage discounts for only three of the four 
penalty assessment criteria set forth above: 75 20 percent for the 
employer's history of previous violations, ten percent for the size of the 
employer's business, and 20 percent for his "good faith." 
This formula was challenged in Secretary of Labor v. Nacirema 
Operating CO.,7 6 where the Commission observed that, although 
Congress had provided for a range of penalties from a minimum of one 
cent to a maximum of $1000,77 this formula always resulted in the 
administration of a minimum fine of $500. The Commission 
accordingly rejected the formula, in thatl it clearly presented both the 
danger of an excessive and burdensome penalty for a violation of 
minimum gravity, as well as the possibility (for different reasons) of a 
nearly insignificant penalty for a violation of maximum gravity. 
Further, it was apparent that the Secretary had not only superimposed 
arbitrary percentage factors, but had given no consideration whatsoever 
to the gravity of the violation. Without more, the Commission could 
not, in good conscience, accept a proposed penalty which had not 
been based upon "due consideration" of the statutory criteria. 
As the Commission's review in Nacirema was limited to the facts in 
that particular case, the Commission could not make a rule requiring 
the Secretary to abandon forever the formula. Whereas the Secretary 
71. [d. 
72. See DEP'T OF LABOR, OSHA COMPLIANCE OPERATIONS MANUAL (rev. 1971). 
73. [d. at xl-2 to x1-4. 
74. OSHA § 17(j), 29 U.S.C. § 666(i) (1970). 
75. [d. 
76. OSHRC Dock. No.4, 2 CCH EMPL. S. & H.G. ~ 15,032 (Feb. 7, 1972). 
77. OSHA § 17, 29 U.S.C. § 666 (1970). 
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must accept the Commission's ruling in each individual case. he is not 
compelled by law to apply that ruling to subsequent cases. This 
situation clearly illustrates that the Review Commission is not a 
substantive rule-making body, but one exercising a judicial function, 
irrespective of where it is placed in the federal government. 
Following Nacirema, the Commission reviewed Hidden ValleY,7 S in 
which OSHA proposed a penalty of $600 for a serious violation of the 
General Duty Clause7•9 that was affirmed by the Commission's judge as 
"not unreasonable." The Commission pointed out that considerations 
involved in one or more of the four stafutory criteriaS 0 may well 
override all of the others in relation to the assessment of a penalty. In 
this case, it found that one of them, "[ t] he gravity, of the violation 
charged,"S 1 was, as the decision termed it, "of signal importance."s 2 
On that basis, the proposed penalty was found to be inadequate, and 
the maximum of $1000 was imposed. 
After Hidden Valley, the Commission decided a number of cases in 
which the Secretary had issued citations for minor violations of safety 
and sanitation standards in which the proposed penalties were so small 
(some less than a parking ticket) that they clearly lacked deterrent 
effect. In Secretary of Labor u. J. E. Chilton Millwork and Lumber 
Co., S 3 for example, the Commission served notice that it believed that 
"[r] elatively minor monetary penalties do little to effectuate [the 
objectives of the Act]. Web therefore, will look carefully at cases 
involving such proposed penalties."s 4 Not only does this sort of minor 
penalty do little toward achievement of a safe and healthful place of 
employment for all workers, but it may have exactly the opposite 
effect. As was stated in Secretary of Labor v. General Meat Co.:S 5 
The Commission believes that the purposes and policies of the 
Act are better served by the encouragement of immediate 
abatement through other means than the proposal of small 
monetary penalties which do little to achieve voluntary 
compliance .... It has been the Commission's experience that 
the proposal of small penalties in these circumstances is often 
interpreted by employers as harassment. This understandable 
reaction of employers frequently results in the filing of a 
contest with its consequent tolling of the abatement period. 
Such contests tend to interfere with the swift accomplishment 
of the goals of the Act. S 6 
78. OSHRC Dock. No. 11,2 CCH EMPL. S. & H.G. ~ 15,035 (Feb. 8, 1972). 
79. OSHA § 5(a)(I), 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(l) (1970). 
80. [d. § 17(j), 29 U.S.C. § 666(i). 
I'll. Id. 
82. OSHRC Dock. No.1:, 2CCH EMPL. S & HG ~ 15,035, at 20,048 (Feb. 8, 1972). 
83. OSHRC Dock. No. 123, 2 CCH EMPL. S. & H.G. ~ 15,069 (May 15, 1972). 
84. [d. at 20,12l. 
85. OSHRC Dock. No. 250, 2 CCH EMPL. S. & H.G. ~ 15,098 (.June 20, 1972). 
86. Id. at 20,156. 
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While there is nothing at all wrong with a penalty proposal of zero 
dollars and zero cents where the purposes of the Act are achieved by 
full abatement,8 7 this should not be taken to mean that the 
Commission will vacate all small penalty proposals for minor violations 
as a matter of course. Thus, in the recent case of Secretary of Labor v. 
Hydroswift Corp.,8 8 the Review Commission endorsed the action of 
one of its judges in assessing small penalties for minor violations. The 
Commission's decision stated: 
We hold that the assessment of small monetary penalties for 
non-serious violations having the level of gravity of the 
violations found in this case (unguarded, opensided floors, two 
fire hazard violations, nine instances of failure to ground power 
tools) effectuates the purpose of this Act. Penalties of this 
caliber serve to remind all employers that their primary 
responsibility under the Act is adherence to its protective 
mechanisms. Failure to impose penalties relating to violations 
with higher levels of gravity serves only to restrain the Act's 
effective operation and hinder its function to reduce the 
hazards of the workplace for all employees . 
. . . We stress that this caution in the face of seemingly minor 
violations reflects a strong intent on our part to see that 
violations of this type are not encouraged by the failure to 
assess penalties when penalties are proper under the circum-
stances.89 
-Although the Commission has established a numoer of guidelines in 
its early concentration on the area of the appropriateness of penalties, 
further refinement and clarification is still in order. The frequency of 
Commission decisions regarding penalties, however, will doubtless 
diminish as the members turn to other areas where vague outlines of 
law need the sharp focus of precedent. 
STIPULATIONS AND PRE-HEARING SETTLEMENTS 
The Act grants the Secretary the opportunity to compromise, settle, 
and mitigate.9o Section 10(c) requires that hearings of the Commission 
be conducted in accordance with 5 U .S.C. § 554, which provides, inter 
alia, for a hearing "to the extent that the parties are unable so to 
87. This view is supported by Senator Williams of New Jersey, a co-author of the Act. In the 
course of responding to employer criticism of citations on the first inspection, he told the 
Senate on September 15, 1972: "This, of course, does not mean that first-instance 
penalties should be imposed in every case, nor does the Act require that penalties be 
assessed-at any time-for non serious violations." 118 CONGo REC. 15,047 (daily ed. Sept. 
15; 1972). 
88. OSHRC Dock. No. 591, 2 CCH EMPL. S. & H.G. 11 15,275 (Oct. 27, 1972). 
89. [d. at 20,368. 
90. OSHA § 6(e), 29 U.S.C. § 655(e) (1970). 
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determine a controversy by consent .... "9 1 It would seem that since 
the Secretary's good faith in enforcing the Act is unquestioned, the 
Commission should, in the absence of fraud, accept settlements reached 
by the Secretary and the employer without involving itself with issues 
not raised by the stipulation. This type of sua sponte involvement 
occurred in Secretary of Labor v. American Home Products (Ekco 
Housewares CO.),9 2 where the employer entered into a stipulation in 
which it agreed to withdraw Notice of Contest and pay the assessment 
as proposed, without admitting the alleged violations. The Review 
Commission Judge accepted the settlement, however, on further review, 
the majority of the Commission determined that the record transmitted 
by the judge indicated that the violation for which the respondent was 
cited was possibly of greater gravity than the judge had determined.9 3 
Accordingly, the Commission issued an order to show cause, in which 
they invited the parties to adduce additional evidence bearing on the 
appropriateness of the proposed penalty. 
I disagreed with the majority on the theory that when the employer 
does not contest the amount of the proposed penalty, the Commission 
should not interfere. Although § 17(j) of the Act gives to the 
Commission the authority to "assess all civil penalties,"94 I reasoned 
that that section is not in conflict with the Act's encouragement to 
achieve settlement whenever possible. As I stated in the dissent: 
The sure and speedy concessions, the abatement of the 
hazard and the saving of the Commission's and the Secretary's 
resources which a settlement achieves outweigh, in my mind, 
the possibility that an employer may be made to smart more 
appropriately by a heavier or more propitious penalty. 
N or should the Commission fret about "whether the stipu-
lated disposition is consistent with the provisions of the Act and 
accords with the public interest." In my opinion, the Commis-
sion does not have sole or even primary responsibility in this 
area. The Secretary of Labor's responsibilities include the 
determination of employer compliance with the Act (Sec. 9(a» 
and he also has both inherent authority, as well as implicit 
authority within the Act itself, to compromise, mitigate and 
settle actions initiated by him (see, for example, Sec. 6(e». Of 
course, he may also conduct a subsequent inspection at any 
time and initiate such action as he deems then to be warranted. 
In view of the Secretary's enormous responsibility and 
authority for occupational safety and health, I find his assent to 
the stipulated settlement of this case most persuasive.9 5 . 
91. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 554(c)(2) (1970). 
92. OSHRC Dock. No.3, 2 CCH EMPL. S. & H.G. ~ 15,025 (Nov. 16, 1971). 
93. [d. at 20,021-22. 
94. OSHA § 17(j), 29 U.S.C. § 666(i) (1970). 
95. OSHRC Dock. No.3, 2 CCH EMPL. S. & H.G. ~ 15,025, at 20,022 (Feb. 16, 1971). 
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After considering the responses to the order to show cause, the 
Commission decided to permit the employer to withdraw without 
change in the penalty previously agreed upon by the parties. 
CONCLUSION 
From its nascence, the Occupational Safety and Health Act has had 
critics assailing it for what they see as its expansive imprecision. Despite 
the differing opinions of its members, the Review Commission has and 
will continue to strive to resolve and clarify those areas where 
ambiguities exist in the Act. It is hoped that this article's discussion of 
the Act's legislative history and the Commission's interpretations of it 
will serve to enlighten those unacquainted ,vith its provisions and to 
familiarize the employer with its requirements and consequences. While 
the scope of this article does not encompass all areas and problems 
associated with the Act, it does provide an occasional glimpse through 
the obfuscation with which the Act has been surrounded by some of its 
detractors. 
